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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Looking at the seemingly endless volumes of the Federal Re-
porter, most people would be shocked to learn that approximately 
eighty percent of all cases brought before the federal appellate courts 
are decided in unpublished form.1 Aside from the obvious implication 
that the text of the case is not published in the Federal Reporter, to 
be unpublished also means that the disposition is either relegated to 
persuasive status or, in those federal appellate circuits with a no-
citation rule, the case can never again be brought to the court’s at-
tention.2 Either way, the result is a vast body of case law that plays 
no active part in the legal system and does little to contribute to legal 
jurisprudence as a whole.  
 Local federal appellate circuit rules vary significantly in all as-
pects of how they manage unpublished opinions—from the guidelines 
that determine whether a case will be disposed of as an unpublished 
opinion to the precedential value and citability of opinions desig-
nated as unpublished. Though with differing terminology,3 all federal 
appellate circuits have rules in place to guide the deciding panel of 
judges in making the publication determination. In turn, each circuit 
has rules mandating the resultant precedential value an unpublished 
opinion will carry. Terminology aside, marked differences in the pre-
cedential value and citability of unpublished dispositions exist 
among the circuits. Eight of the thirteen federal appellate circuits al-
low citation4 to an unpublished opinion for persuasive value.5 The 
remaining five circuits disallow citation to unpublished dispositions 
                                                                                                                      
 1. United States Courts, 2002 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the 
United States Courts, tbl. s-3 (2003), at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/tables/ 
s03sep02.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2003). As the table indicates, these figures do not ac-
count for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id. However, at the 
1999 Federal Circuit Judicial Conference, Chief Judge Mayer reported that sixty-eight per-
cent of the cases decided on the merits in 1998 “were disposed of with a non-precedential 
opinion, what the other courts may call unpublished.” Sixteenth Annual Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 193 F.R.D. 263, 266 
(Apr. 6, 1999). 
 2. In a recent change, the D.C. Circuit now allows unpublished dispositions entered 
on or after January 1, 2002 to be “cited as precedent.” D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B). This desig-
nation as precedent appears to be the equivalent of binding precedent, resulting in the 
need for an en banc proceeding to overrule an unpublished case. Regardless, “a panel’s de-
cision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value 
in that disposition.” D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2). There is no contention in any other circuit that 
unpublished opinions can be anything other than persuasive, and even then citation to un-
published opinions is frowned upon. 
 3. For example, the Federal Circuit uses the term “[n]onprecedential [o]pinion” to 
denote what most other circuits call an unpublished opinion. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b). 
 4. All circuits allow for citation of a case under the doctrine of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, law of the case, or the like. Such unremarkable instances, however, are not the 
focal point of this debate. 
 5. See 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.7; 4TH CIR. R. 36(c); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4; 6TH CIR. R. 
28(g); 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(B); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B). 
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altogether.6  
 In order to gain a general understanding of the publication con-
troversy, this Comment begins with a brief review of the publication 
debate, along with the most recent congressional and judicial devel-
opments in the area. Part III then surveys the various publication 
plans throughout the circuits, including the various criteria used by 
the circuits in determining when a disposition will be published and 
the practical effect of the publication determination on the preceden-
tial value of a disposition.7 The focus of Part III is to introduce a set 
of paradigmatic publication guidelines which basically represent the 
goal the circuits are attempting to achieve through the various crite-
ria they use—namely, relegating unpublished status only on those 
opinions with no precedential value.8  
 Parts IV and V review the various constitutional and policy ar-
guments for and against rules limiting the precedential value of un-
published opinions in light of this set of paradigmatic publication 
guidelines. The conclusion drawn from Parts IV and V demonstrates 
that, if paradigmatic publication criteria could be applied without er-
ror, no litigant could challenge a circuit’s publication plan because 
there would be no cognizable injury. In other words, if an unpub-
lished opinion truly lacks precedential value, there is a published 
opinion that will adequately serve the litigant’s purpose.  
 Along with demonstrating that error-free application of publica-
tion guidelines cannot be achieved, Part VI argues that the focus of 
the debate over unpublished opinions must be shifted from the vari-
ous constitutional and policy arguments to the publication guidelines 
that produce them. This Comment concludes with a proposed course 
of action that the federal appellate judiciary must take to develop 
and implement a publication plan that will produce unpublished 
opinions that truly have no precedential value.  
 The aim of this endeavor is to have the judiciary gain a better un-
derstanding of exactly what “precedential value” is and, as a conse-
quence, make consistent publication choices. Only when the elusive 
concept of precedential value is well understood can an answer to the 
publication dilemma be realized. 
                                                                                                                      
 6. See 1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(2)(F); 2D CIR. R. § 0.23; 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9TH CIR. R. 
36-3(b); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b). 
 7. Though not addressed in this Comment, all state courts likewise have rules re-
garding publication and citation of opinions. See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, 
Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 251 (2001). 
 8. Precedential value is an elusive concept, hence the considerable variation in crite-
ria used by the circuits. See generally infra Part III. 
754  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:751 
 
II.   THE PUBLICATION DEBATE: PAST AND PRESENT 
A.   “Unpublished” as a Misnomer 
 “Unpublished,” as used in this debate, is a term of art with reper-
cussions not present under a conventional definition. As the term 
implies, the content of an unpublished opinion is excluded from the 
Federal Reporter,9 the official reporter for the federal courts of ap-
peals. However, all but two federal circuits10 make the full text of un-
published opinions available both on their websites and, as of Sep-
tember 2001, to the West Group’s Federal Appendix (which consists 
entirely of unpublished opinions—complete with headnotes indexed 
to West’s Key Number system). With the E-Government Act of 2002, 
even the two holdout circuits will be forced to post all decisions, in-
cluding unpublished decisions, on their websites.11 Most circuits also 
release unpublished opinions to online databases such as Lexis and 
Westlaw. Furthermore, hard copies of unpublished opinions may be 
obtained from each particular circuit’s clerk of the court. That is to 
say, the term unpublished does not mean that the opinion is unavail-
able or even difficult to find. The primary implication of an opinion 
being disposed of as unpublished is the precedential status and cita-
tion restriction imposed by the respective local circuit rule.12 This 
Comment uses the term “unpublished” in this specialized sense.  
B.   The Origin of Federal Appellate Circuit Publication Guidelines 
 The general authority to promulgate rules governing the internal 
operation of the federal appellate courts derives from the Rules Ena-
bling Act.13 Publication guidelines and rules governing precedential 
value originate from the 1964 Judicial Conference of the United 
States where it was resolved that federal courts of appeals should 
publish “only those opinions which are of general precedential 
value.”14 At first, the circuits were relatively slow to respond, but in 
1972 the Conference mandated that each circuit develop a publica-
                                                                                                                      
 9. Unpublished opinions are excluded from the official reporter but for a listing in a 
table of decisions stating only the result of the disposition. 
 10. The two circuits not currently contributing to the Federal Appendix or making 
unpublished opinions available on their websites are the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. 
Paradoxically, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits allow citation to unpublished opinions. 
See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2.  
 11. See Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (2002). 
 12. Some federal circuits do not use the term “unpublished” in their respective rules 
dealing with precedential value of opinions. See FED. CIR. R. 47.6; 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 
5.1-5.7; 2D CIR. R. § 0.23. Regardless, the process by which the court determines the prece-
dential value placed on the opinion can fairly be called the publication process. 
 13. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2002). 
 14. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 11 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS]. 
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tion plan.15 By 1974, all circuits adopted a Conference-approved pub-
lication plan.16 Shortly thereafter, the publication plans took effect 
and courts began instituting corresponding restrictive citation 
rules.17  
 Selective publication plans favoring unpublished opinions were 
promoted in response to the exponentially expanding volume of cases 
before the courts.18 The increasing caseload resulted in judges spend-
ing a disproportionate amount of time crafting, and lawyers re-
searching, opinions not amenable to the meaningful development of 
the law.19 In addition, publication plans addressed the threat to a co-
hesive body of law that unlimited proliferation of published opinions 
might create.20 In other words, publication plans were initially im-
plemented to allay the fear that “judges, unable to digest the bur-
geoning volumes of case law, would inadvertently make inconsistent 
rulings.”21 Another driving force behind the creation of limited publi-
cation plans was “the ever increasing practical difficulty and eco-
nomic cost of establishing and maintaining accessible private and 
public law library facilities.”22 While many of these concerns are still 
applicable today, others have become obsolete with the advent of new 
technologies.23 
C.   Congressional Inquiry into the Publication Arena 
 The debate over the propriety of not according unpublished deci-
sions precedential value has gone so far as to prompt congressional 
inquiry. On June 27, 2002, four legal scholars spoke before the Sub-
committee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary: Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Third Cir-
                                                                                                                      
 15. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS 33 (1972). 
 16. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publi-
cation in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 
578-79 (1981). 
 17. Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 5-6 
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 Statements to Congress] (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See David Greenwald & Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1141-42 (2002) (citing 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 14, at 11). 
 20. See Charles W. Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 
195 (1972). 
 21. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1143. 
 22. Id. at 1141 (quoting 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14, at 
11). As discussed infra Part V.A, the advent of electronic databases all but eviscerates the 
viability of this particular concern. 
 23. Part V, infra, addresses these concerns in their present context. 
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cuit judge and Chair of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules; 
Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit judge and long time advocate of no-
citation rules; Kenneth J. Schmier, outspoken advocate against no-
citation rules; and Arthur D. Hellman, Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh School of Law.24 The hearing was held to gauge 
whether a problem existed and, if so, what Congress might do to al-
leviate the problem. Only Judge Kozinski actually commented on the 
appropriateness (or more accurately inappropriateness) of a congres-
sional foray into the area of appellate judicial rulemaking.25 The 
speakers basically used the opportunity as a forum to advocate their 
respective positions on propriety of unpublished opinions. 
D.   Proposed Judicial Reform 
 The debate, spurred by federal circuit courts’ differing preceden-
tial treatment of unpublished dispositions, led the federal Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Appellate Procedure to consider, and ap-
prove in principle, a new Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1.26 
As announced at the November 18, 2002 meeting, the new rule would 
create a uniform procedure allowing citation for persuasive value of 
unpublished opinions in all federal appellate courts.27 The next step 
in the path to final approval and implementation of the rule occurred 
at the May 15, 2003 meeting in Washington, D.C., where the Advi-
sory Committee considered revised drafts of this and other proposed 
amendments.28 The text of the proposed rule was unveiled at the May 
15 meeting: 
Rule 32.1. Citation of Judicial Dispositions 
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be im-
posed upon the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or 
other written dispositions that have been designated as “unpub-
lished,” “not for publication,” “non-precedential,” “not precedent,” 
or the like, unless that prohibition or restriction is generally im-
posed upon the citation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, 
or other written dispositions. 
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order, 
judgment, or other written disposition that is not available in a 
publicly accessible electronic database must file and serve a copy of 
                                                                                                                      
 24. 2002 Statements to Congress, supra note 17 (statements of Judge Samuel A. Alito, 
Jr., Alex Kozinski, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Kenneth J. 
Schmier, Chairman, Committee for the Rule of Law, and Arthur D. Hellman, Professor of 
Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law). 
 25. See id. at 15-16 (Alex Kozinski’s statement). 
 26. Proposed rule 32.1 is posted on the United States Courts website, as maintained 
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts on behalf of the United States 
Courts. United States Courts, Federal Rulemaking, at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index. 
html (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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that opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition with the 
brief or other paper in which it is cited.29 
 What this rule does not do is as important to understand as what 
it does do. According to the Committee Note following the text of the 
proposed rule: 
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited. It takes no position on whether re-
fusing to treat an “unpublished” opinion as binding precedent is 
constitutional. It does not require any court to issue an “unpub-
lished” opinion or forbid any court from doing so. It does not dic-
tate the circumstances under which a court may choose to desig-
nate an opinion as “unpublished” or specify the procedure that a 
court must follow in making that decision. It says nothing about 
what effect a court must give to one of its “unpublished” opinions 
or to the “unpublished” opinions of another court. The one and only 
issue addressed by Rule 32.1 is the citation of judicial dispositions 
. . . .30 
 Because of the various steps of revision and approval the proposed 
rule must undergo, including Standing Committee approval, Judicial 
Conference approval, Supreme Court approval, and a statutory pe-
riod where Congress may take action, the earliest date such a rule 
would take effect is likely December of 2005.31 
E.   The Focus of the Debate over Unpublished Opinions 
 Substantially all of the argument in this area focuses on the con-
stitutionality and/or propriety of publication and citation rules. How-
ever, courts and commentators have based all these arguments on 
the product that these rules produce (i.e. nonprecedential opinions), 
as opposed to the publication plans that produce them. In other 
words, a proponent of affording unpublished opinions precedential 
value would argue that restrictive publication and citation rules cre-
ate a body of case law which, while appearing to be useful to a lawyer 
in the course of litigation, cannot be brought to the attention of the 
court.32 The focal point of such an argument is on the nonpreceden-
                                                                                                                      
 29. Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appel-
late Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 28 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/app0803.pdf 
[hereinafter Alito Memorandum]. 
 30. Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted). The concluding section of this Comment discusses 
in more detail exactly how this new uniform rule fits into the publication debate. 
 31. See United States Courts, Federal Rulemaking, The Rulemaking Process: A Sum-
mary for the Bench and Bar (2002), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2003). 
 32. See, e.g., Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opin-
ions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means of Se-
crecy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235 (1998); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judi-
cial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995). 
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tial opinion, as opposed to the publication plan that created it. Like-
wise, an advocate of rules affording unpublished opinions no prece-
dential value would point to the untenable burden less restrictive 
rules would create.33 This Comment attempts to view the arguments 
for and against limited precedential value rules in light of the publi-
cation guidelines that produce such nonprecedential case law.  
 In a basic sense, publication guidelines state that an opinion will 
not be published (i.e. be fully precedential) when such a disposition 
will not add “significantly to the body of law,”34 or, in an even more 
general sense, where the opinion has no precedential value.35 Some 
circuits use only general statements to guide the publication deter-
mination,36 while other circuits are explicit in setting forth criteria to 
achieve this stated goal.37 
 The point at which an opinion is determined to be unpublished is 
the linchpin of the debate. It is at this point that the opinion becomes 
full precedential case law or, in the strictest circuits, a case that can 
never again be brought to the attention of the court. Taking into ac-
count the impact of declaring an opinion unpublished, critical analy-
sis from this viewpoint is warranted. As a starting point, a crucial 
yet often overlooked point about the current state of affairs must be 
addressed: If publication guidelines were followed as written, the en-
tire publication debate would be moot. No colorable argument based 
on a deprivation of vital case law could come about since, by defini-
tion, an unpublished disposition would only stand for a proposition 
already firmly embedded in published, precedential case law. In 
short, with no viable injury, no litigant could have standing to chal-
lenge citation rules in the courtroom. This line of reasoning is carried 
out in more detail and applied to specific arguments for and against 
citation restrictions in Parts IV and V.  
F.   Publication Guidelines in Practical Context 
 As with anything subject to human discretion, publication guide-
lines cannot be applied without (at least occasional) error.38 One 
problem presents itself where, in a circuit disallowing citation to an 
unpublished opinion, such an error, if not corrected immediately, 
                                                                                                                      
 33. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 34. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b). 
 35. See 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.2; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1; 11TH CIR. R. IOP 36-3(5).  
 36. See 2D CIR. R. § 0.23; 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.3; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1; 11TH CIR. R. 
IOP 36-3(5). 
 37. See 1ST CIR. R. 36(b); 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1; 6TH CIR. R. 206; 7TH 
CIR. R. 53(c); 8TH CIR. R. App. I; 9TH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. CIR. R. 36(a); FED. CIR. R. App. V, 
IOP 10. 
 38. Part V, infra, isolates how publication guidelines have been misapplied. 
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cannot be corrected at all.39 If a litigant believes an opinion should 
have been designated as published but was not, some circuits allow a 
short period of time for the present litigants, or in some cases inter-
ested parties, to petition the court to have the opinion published.40 
Because an unpublished opinion is not written in a way that makes 
it suitable for future litigants to rely upon, changing an opinion’s la-
bel from “unpublished” to “published” does not completely alleviate 
the problem.41  
 At the very least, if publication guidelines are to persist, citation 
to opinions for persuasive value must be allowed. Even with a mis-
take as to publication, a later litigant, while only having a “persua-
sive”42 opinion to cite, has a chance of settling the issue in a prece-
dential decision by referencing the court to the earlier unpublished 
opinion. In a worst-case scenario, a string of unpublished decisions 
on an unsettled area of law would signal a need to settle the question 
in a precedential form. If such a state of affairs could not be brought 
to the attention of the court, it might only be answered by happen-
stance, if at all. 
 In order for publication guidelines to be sufficiently effectual, sig-
nificant reform is called for, though not solely in the form of revising 
the criteria contained in the guidelines. No matter how specific or de-
tailed the listing of factors, subjectivity and natural human error will 
not allow for acceptable application of the guidelines. When speaking 
of acceptability, not only must the selective publication plan be ame-
nable to the proper functioning of the federal appellate process, but 
                                                                                                                      
 39. See infra text accompanying note 40. 
 40. In the Federal and Ninth Circuits the time period is 60 days after the unpublished 
opinion has been issued. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(c); 9TH CIR. R. 36-4. The D.C. Circuit gives a 30-
day time limit, though the impact of this allowance is minimized since the D.C. Circuit 
(and only the D.C. Circuit) affords unpublished opinions issued after January 1, 2002 pre-
cedential value. D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B), 36(d). The Fourth Circuit, while not giving a time 
period, states that “[c]ounsel may move for publication . . .,” thereby indicating that the 
window for petition is limited. 4TH CIR. R. 36(b). The Eleventh Circuit is much the same. 
See 11TH CIR. R. 36-3. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit allows any person to “request by mo-
tion” reconsideration of the publication decision, apparently meaning that the request 
must come from counsel during the litigation process. 7TH CIR. R. 53(d)(3). The First Cir-
cuit and Fifth Circuit do not explicitly give a time limit for petitioning the court to publish 
a previously unpublished opinion. 1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(2)(D); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.2. As is dis-
cussed tangentially, infra Part V, a longer time period may do no good to later parties. 
Since an unpublished disposition will not likely have necessary elements to make a reliable 
precedent and a significant amount of time has elapsed since the case, the court would ba-
sically have to review the case de novo and re-issue a new opinion to transform the opinion 
into reliable precedent (as opposed to simply using the same work product and re-
designating it as “published”). Finally, the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits 
give no opportunity to petition the court to reconsider the publication decision. See 2D CIR. 
R. § 0.23; 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.3; 6TH CIR. R. 206; 8TH CIR. R. App. I; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1. 
 41. See infra Part VI. 
 42. The persuasiveness (or lack thereof) of opinions designated as unpublished is dis-
cussed further infra Part VII. 
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to the general populous as well. That is to say, keeping in mind the 
impact attendant to the publication decision along with our jurispru-
dential insistence on safeguarding through various appellate proc-
esses, the publication system must be designed to ensure (or least at-
tempt to ensure) the accuracy of the publication decision.43 
III.   SURVEY OF CURRENT LOCAL RULES REGARDING PUBLICATION 
AND CITATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
A.   Publication Guidelines 
 As stated previously, all circuits have a rule encompassing an idea 
akin to publication. However, guidelines vary from general to fairly 
detailed. The survey begins with the circuits that give only broad 
guidance, then moves to those with explicit criteria. The purpose of 
this review is to glean an understanding of what courts look for in 
determining whether to publish a decision. 
1. Circuits Elucidating Only General Guidance Concerning 
Publication 
 Only the Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits fail to give 
an explicit list of criteria for the deciding panel to take into account 
in making the publication decision.44 In the Second Circuit, a disposi-
tion will remain unpublished45 where “no jurisprudential purpose 
would be served by a [precedential] written opinion.”46 According to 
the Third Circuit, an opinion will be published “when it has prece-
dential or institutional value.”47 Conversely, an opinion is designated 
as not precedential where it “appears to have value only to the trial 
court or the parties.”48 Similarly, in the Tenth Circuit, a disposition 
will not be published where “the case does not require application of 
new points of law that would make the decision a valuable prece-
dent.”49 Finally, in the Eleventh Circuit, “[o]pinions that the panel [of 
                                                                                                                      
 43. This issue is addressed in more detail infra Part VII. 
 44. See 2D CIR. R. § 0.23; 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.2, 5.3; 10TH CIR. R. 36.1; 11TH CIR. 
R. 36-3, IOP 5. 
 45. The Second Circuit does not have a publication plan per se, but instead issues 
precedential written opinions, nonprecedential open court dispositions, or nonprecedential 
summary orders. 2D CIR. R. § 0.23. Regardless, an opinion rendered in nonprecedential 
form is the functional equivalent of an unpublished opinion. But see D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B) 
(noting that the D.C. Circuit has the only local circuit rule considering an unpublished 
opinion precedent). 
 46. 2D CIR. R. § 0.23. 
 47. 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.2. 
 48. Id. at App. I, IOP 5.3. 
 49. 10TH CIR. R. 36.1. 
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deciding judges] believes to have no precedential value are not pub-
lished.”50 
2.   Circuits Expounding Specific Criteria Regarding Publication 
 Since many of the criteria listed by the circuits are repetitive, the 
most exhaustive list is quoted (that of the Federal Circuit), and the 
criteria of the remaining circuits not addressed in the Federal Cir-
cuit’s listing are discussed. In most of the circuits listing publication 
criteria, the publication rule has language mandating publication 
where one or more of the criteria listed are met.51 In the remaining 
circuits, the language associated with the criteria appears more per-
missive.52 Regardless, the goal of publication criteria remains the 
same—to determine factors indicating when a decision merits publi-
cation and, more significantly, has precedential value. 
 Publication guidelines for the Federal Circuit: 
(a) The case is a test case. 
(b) An issue of first impression is treated. 
(c) A new rule of law is established. 
(d) An existing rule of law is criticized, clarified, altered, or modi-
fied. 
(e) An existing rule of law is applied to facts significantly different 
from those to which that rule has previously been applied. 
(f) An actual or apparent conflict in or with past holdings of this 
court or other courts is created, resolved, or continued. 
(g) A legal issue of substantial public interest, which the court has 
not sufficiently treated recently, is resolved. 
(h) A significantly new factual situation, likely to be of interest to a 
wide spectrum of persons other than the parties to a case, is set 
forth. 
                                                                                                                      
 50. 11TH CIR. R. 36-3, IOP 5. 
 51. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a) (“Opinions . . . will be published only if the opinion satisfies” 
the criteria. This language might, however, suggest that meeting the criteria is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient, element to achieving publication.); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (differing in 
that publication is permissive if the decision contains a concurrence or dissent without 
meeting the other criteria); 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1) (noting a published opinion “will be filed” 
when the criteria are met); 9TH CIR. R. 36-2 (containing the same “only if” language as the 
Fourth Circuit rule); D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(2) (stating that opinions meeting the criteria “will 
be published”). 
 52. See 1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(1) (The policy in favor of publication “may be overcome” 
where certain criteria are absent.); 6TH CIR. R. 206(a) (“The following criteria shall be con-
sidered” in the publication decision. (emphasis added)); 8TH CIR. R. App. I(4) (“An opinion 
should be published” when one of the criteria are met. (emphasis added)); FED. CIR. R. 
App. V, IOP 10(4) (Publication is “limit[ed] . . . to dispositions meeting one or more of the[] 
criteria.”). 
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(i) A new interpretation of a Supreme Court decision, or of a stat-
ute, is set forth. 
(j) A new constitutional or statutory issue is treated. 
(k) A previously overlooked rule of law is treated. 
(l) Procedural errors, or errors in the conduct of the judicial proc-
ess, are corrected, whether by remand with instructions or other-
wise. 
(m) The case has been returned by the U.S. Supreme Court for 
disposition by action of this court other than ministerial obedience 
to directions of the Court. 
(n) A panel desires to adopt as precedent in this court an opinion of 
a lower tribunal, in whole or in part.53 
 The remaining seven circuits use a mish-mash of these criteria 
along with some factors not included in the Federal Circuit guide-
lines. For example, in the Seventh Circuit,54 an opinion will be pub-
lished if the decision “constitutes a significant and non-duplicative 
contribution to legal literature (A) by a historical review of law, (B) 
by describing legislative history, or (C) by resolving or creating a con-
flict in the law,”55 or where the decision “reverses a judgment or de-
nies enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency has 
published an opinion supporting the judgment or order.”56 The 
Eighth Circuit mandates publication where the case “does not accept 
the rationale of a previously published opinion in that case.”57 Fur-
ther, some circuits include as a factor for publication whether the de-
cision includes a separate concurring or dissenting opinion.58  
B.   Citation Limitation and Corresponding Precedential Status 
 Of the four circuits59 not enumerating a list of criteria in their 
publication guidelines, only the Second Circuit does not allow cita-
tion to dispositions other than formal opinions.60 Though allowing ci-
tation for persuasive value only, both the Tenth and Eleventh Cir-
                                                                                                                      
 53. FED. CIR. R. App. V, IOP 10(4). 
 54. This factor is not exclusive to the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)(iv). 
In fact, none of the additional factors listed are exclusive to the particular circuit. The 
point of listing them is simply to give an overview of all possible criteria. 
 55. 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1)(iv). 
 56. Id. at 53(c)(1)(v). 
 57. 8TH CIR. R. App. I(4)(e). 
 58. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1; 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(4); 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(g). 
 59. The Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 
 60. 2D CIR. R. § 0.23. Even so, as with all circuit rules, any unpublished or nonprece-
dential disposition may be cited in an assertion of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judi-
cial estoppel, law of the case, or the like. See, e.g., id. (Unpublished opinions “shall not be 
cited . . . in unrelated cases.”). 
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cuits disfavor such citation.61 The Third Circuit itself does not cite 
“not precedential opinions,” but apparently allows litigants to call 
such cases to the attention of the court for persuasive value.62 
 Of the remaining nine circuits,63 the First, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Federal Circuits do not allow citation to unpublished opinions.64 
Thus, the total number of circuits disallowing citation of unpublished 
opinions is five,65 leaving eight circuits allowing for citation to unpub-
lished opinions.66 Both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits disfavor cita-
tion, but will allow counsel to cite to an unpublished case (apparently 
for persuasive value) if no published opinion would serve as well.67 
Though not explicitly disfavoring citation, the Fifth Circuit allows ci-
tation for persuasive value while making clear that unpublished 
opinions are not precedent.68 Finally, the D.C. Circuit, in what is ar-
guably the most progressive stance among the circuits, allows all un-
published dispositions issued on or after January 1, 2002 to be “cited 
as precedent.”69  
C.   The Rules in Perspective 
 Regardless of whether assigning general or specific guidance, the 
aim of all the circuits’ publication plans is to publish any opinion that 
would yield precedential value. Though statements of policy and cri-
teria differ in expressing what precedential value is and how to 
evaluate whether it exists, a broad ideology emerges wherein a case 
                                                                                                                      
 61. 10TH CIR. R. 36.3; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2, 36-3, IOP 5. 
 62. 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.7. 
 63. The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, D.C., and Federal Cir-
cuits. 
 64. See 1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(2)(F); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(b); FED. CIR. 
R. 47.6(b). 
 65. The First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits do not allow citation to 
unpublished opinions. See 1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(2)(F); 2D CIR. R. § 0.23; 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 
9TH CIR. R. 36-3(b); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b). 
 66. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits allow 
citation to unpublished opinions. See 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.7; 4TH CIR. R. 36(c); 5TH CIR. 
R. 47.5.4; 6TH CIR. R. 28(g); 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(B); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2; D.C. 
CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B). 
 67. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(c); 6TH CIR. R. 28(g). 
 68. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Note, however, the Fifth Circuit distinguishes between un-
published opinions issued before and after January 1, 1996. Id. at 47.5.3, 47.5.4. Unpub-
lished opinions issued before January 1, 1996 are precedent, but “should normally be cited 
only when the doctrine of res judicata, . . . [etc.] is applicable.” Id. at 47.5.3. 
 69. D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B). However, the court explicitly warns litigants “a panel’s 
decision to issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential 
value in that disposition.” Id. at 36(c)(2). Further, the court warns counsel to “review the 
criteria governing published and unpublished opinions . . . in connection with reliance 
upon unpublished dispositions.” Id. at 28(c)(1)(B). 
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is worthy of publication if it will be a guide to future litigants or con-
tribute to legal jurisprudence generally.70 
 Listing and reviewing the criteria associated with publication 
gives a sense of how the federal appellate circuits as a whole define 
cases worthy of precedent. Regardless of the form, all publication 
guidelines strive to achieve publication of only those opinions con-
taining precedential value. From this general understanding, the 
concept of paradigmatic publication guidelines emerges. Paradig-
matic publication guidelines are a fictitious set of guidelines captur-
ing the essence of precedential value as defined by circuit publication 
criteria generally. When appropriately applied, they can flawlessly 
delineate between those cases having precedential value and those 
without. Through the lens of paradigmatic publication guidelines, the 
true nature of the arguments for and against precedential value in 
the publication arena is revealed. This revelation will bring into fo-
cus the as yet unaddressed problems with publication plans as a 
whole. 
IV.   CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AND PARADIGMATIC PUBLICATION 
GUIDELINES 
A.   Anastasoff v. United States and the Article III Argument 
1.   Anastasoff in the Context of the Debate 
 Judge Richard Arnold saw the concern raised by him in his 1999 
article71 brought to bear in the form of Anastasoff v. United States.72 
In Anastasoff, the court was faced with a previously decided unpub-
lished opinion that, if binding on the current panel, would control the 
outcome of the case.73 However, the Eighth Circuit Rule regarding ci-
tation of unpublished opinions explicitly states that unpublished 
opinions are not precedent and may only be cited “if the opinion has 
persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion . . . 
would serve as well.”74 Judge Arnold, writing for the Eighth Circuit, 
struck down Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i) as unconstitutional where it 
                                                                                                                      
 70. For example, though enumerating a list of factors, the D.C. Circuit’s general pol-
icy is to publish dispositions “that have general public interest.” D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(1). 
Without listing any guidelines, the Second Circuit’s policy is to publish any opinion that 
serves a “jurisprudential purpose.” 2D CIR. R. § 0.23. 
 71. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 219, 226 (1999) (“[I]s the assertion that unpublished opinions are not precedent 
and cannot be cited a violation of Article III?”). 
 72. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc). 
 73. Id. at 899. 
 74. 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i). The rule also states that “parties generally should not cite [un-
published opinions].” Id. 
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“expand[s] the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III.”75 
More specifically, Judge Arnold found that, since the Eighth Circuit 
rule allows the Article III judiciary to shirk its responsibility to fol-
low previous decisions, the rule went beyond the judicial power con-
ferred on federal courts by Article III.76 In other words, Judge Arnold 
found that Article III mandates all decisions be strictly binding on 
future panels. 
 Basically, through a review of history surrounding Article III and 
the doctrine of precedent, Judge Arnold found the framers to have 
impliedly meant in the scant language of Article III77 that every de-
cided case must necessarily become binding precedent.78 The court 
concluded that “[a] more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated 
by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all 
former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference 
to the settled course of antecedent principles.”79 
 While some commentators agree with the outcome in Anastasoff,80 
most agree that a binding precedential mandate is not contemplated 
by Article III. In fact, two federal appellate cases, Hart v. Massa-
nari81 and Symbol Technologies v. Lemelson Medical,82 as well as sev-
eral commentators,83 have squarely disagreed with Judge Arnold’s 
recount of history and conclusion as to Article III. In Hart, the Ninth 
Circuit decided the exact same Article III issue as presented in Anas-
tasoff and came to the opposite conclusion.84 The Hart court ruled on 
the Article III issue in the context of an attorney citing an unpub-
                                                                                                                      
 75. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900. 
 76. See Id.  
 77. Article III, Section 1, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution states: “The judi-
cial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 
 78. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-05. 
 79. Id. at 904. 
 80. Steve Sheppard, The Unpublished Opinion: How Richard Arnold’s Anastasoff 
Opinion Is Saving America’s Courts from Themselves, 2002 ARK. L. NOTES 85 (2002). 
 81. 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 82. 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The court “subscribe[d] to the comprehensive, 
scholarly treatment of the [Article III] issue in refutation of Anastasoff set out in Hart v. 
Massanari.” Id. at 1367 (citation omitted). The court also found “[b]ecause Judge Kozin-
ski’s opinion for the Hart court is so thorough, we need do little more than signal our 
agreement with it by synopsizing the main points.” Id. at 1367 n.*. 
 83. See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. 
REV. 43 (2001); Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial 
Power to “Unpublish” Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135 (2001); 2002 Statements to 
Congress, supra note 17 (statement of Arthur D. Hellman) (“It is most implausible to sup-
pose that the sparse language of Article III encompasses a command (or more accurately a 
set of commands) governing the precedential effect of intermediate appellate court deci-
sions.”). 
 84. 266 F.3d at 1160. Unlike the Eighth Circuit, in the Ninth Circuit, litigants may 
not cite unpublished opinions for persuasive value. 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(b). Be that as it may, 
both courts framed the issue identically. 
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lished opinion in violation of the local circuit rule against such cita-
tion.85 Using Anastasoff’s reasoning as a basis for comparison, Judge 
Kozinski squarely refuted Judge Arnold’s interpretation of history 
and Article III in ruling on the propriety of the Ninth Circuit’s rule 
affording unpublished opinions no precedential value (and the corre-
sponding no-citation rule).86 In reviewing the history of precedent in 
Western jurisprudence, Judge Kozinski found the issuance of non-
precedential opinions comports with our notion of precedent and Ar-
ticle III.87 Going a step further, Judge Kozinski characterized no-
citation rules as essential to the proper functioning of the federal ap-
pellate judiciary.88 
 Nevertheless, it is important to note the limited application of the 
issue raised in Anastasoff and Hart—namely, whether or not all 
cases must be binding89 precedent under Article III.90 As stated by 
Judge Kozinski in Hart, binding precedent is “where a single opinion 
sets the course on a particular point of law and must be followed by 
courts at the same level and lower within a pyramidal judicial hier-
archy.”91 The current debate focuses principally on the propriety of 
local rules in the context of whether unpublished opinions should be 
afforded any precedential value.92 The point being, the actual hold-
ings in Anastasoff and Hart are somewhat peripheral to the crux of 
the debate as there is currently no contention that all decisions must 
bind future panels in the same circuit. Put concisely, the current de-
bate is whether all decisions must be considered by future panels for 
their persuasive value if presented in the proper context. 
2.   Anastasoff in Light of Paradigmatic Publication Guidelines 
 In the larger context, Anastasoff is a case where the court felt 
bound by a previous unpublished decision93 that decided a rule of law 
previously unaddressed by the Eighth Circuit.94 Recall also that 
Judge Arnold’s main concern about the local rule was the conse-
                                                                                                                      
 85. 266 F.3d at 1158-59. 
 86. See id. at 1159-60. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. at 1176-80. 
 89. Binding precedent as opposed to being afforded merely persuasive value. 
 90. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that be-
cause the issue raised was decided in a previously unpublished decision, the local circuit 
rule disallowing citation “does not free us from our obligation to follow that decision”). 
 91. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1168. 
 92. See Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The 
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 12 (2002) (“The key 
issue today is not whether unpublished opinions must be binding precedents; it is whether 
they may be cited at all.”). 
 93. Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992). The case, in 
essence, decided the application of the “mail-box rule” to untimely tax refund claims. Id. 
 94. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899. 
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quence such a rule brings about: A court could decide a case and “dis-
regard all former rules and decisions . . . without reference to the set-
tled course of antecedent principles.”95 However, if taken as true that 
such rules operate in this manner, it must follow that publication 
guidelines operate defectively. In essence, when making the publica-
tion decision (and, by extension, the inextricably linked decision as to 
precedential value), Judge Arnold’s very concern is supposed to be 
the guidepost steering the publication determination. In other words, 
if there were a settled course of antecedent principles in the form of 
fully precedential published opinions (which there would have to be 
to justify the decision not to publish an opinion),96 such rules and de-
cisions could not rightfully be ignored.97 Therefore, the problem faced 
by Judge Arnold was created well before Anastasoff came up on the 
docket. The problem was created in 1992 when the panel decided the 
case Judge Arnold purported to be bound by. With the benefit of 
20/20 hindsight, it can unremarkably be said that the deciding panel 
in 1992 erred in the publication decision.98 As such, in the light most 
favorable to Judge Arnold, the court was attempting to resolve a cur-
rent problem created by an improper publication decision that oc-
curred years earlier. To be exact, had the panel deciding the 1992 
case properly applied the publication guidelines, the decision would 
have been published and Judge Arnold would not have had Anas-
tasoff as a forum for his Article III dissertation.  
 As a general proposition, if panels could unerringly follow para-
digmatic publication guidelines, the Article III issue would never 
arise for the simple reason that no litigant would properly have 
standing to file suit on those grounds.99 In other words, no court 
could be charged with violating Article III by not following a previous 
unpublished decision because any significant proposition being relied 
on would already be embodied in a precedential published opinion.100  
 Regardless of whether a model of flawless paradigmatic publica-
tion application will ever be achieved, the problem is one of applica-
                                                                                                                      
 95. Id. at 904. 
 96. See supra Part III. 
 97. If published precedent was ignored, the panel would clearly be violating the law of 
the circuit.  
 98. Or, at least, erred in the sense of paradigmatic publication guidelines. 
 99. For example, a case in the Ninth Circuit was dismissed where the litigant lacked 
standing to challenge the no-citation rule for failure to demonstrate injury due to the local 
circuit rules. Schmier v. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 136 F. Supp. 
2d 1048, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 279 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2002). Kenneth J. Schmier, al-
so giving a statement to Congress regarding unpublished opinions, was involved in this 
case and other (unsuccessful) litigation. See Schmier v. Supreme Court, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
580 (Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000); Schmier v. United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 34 Fed. Appx. 389 (11th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). 
 100. To be more precise, any significant proposition being relied upon would either be 
in a precedential published opinion or one of first impression. 
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tion of publication guidelines, as opposed to a constitutionally 
charged Article III argument.101 Isolating the cause of the problem, as 
opposed to the difficulties created by the problem, is the essential 
first step towards solving the precedential dilemma. 
B.   The First Amendment Argument 
1.   The First Amendment in the Context of Unpublished Opinions 
 “A court . . . in promulgating its rules is subject to limitations 
based on reasonableness and conformity to constitutional and statu-
tory provisions . . . .”102 As such, federal circuit court rules must com-
ply with the First Amendment.103 
 The First Amendment argument against no-citation rules can be 
stated rather simply: Legal argument is protected speech and no-
citation rules abridge this speech by prohibiting access to certain 
types of arguments.104 Namely, arguments purporting that a particu-
lar unpublished opinion militate a desired outcome are restricted.105 
In a very basic sense, under First Amendment jurisprudence and as 
applicable to the citation debate, restrictions on speech are classified 
as either content-neutral or content-based. A content-neutral restric-
tion shows no bias toward a particular idea and “may impose reason-
able restrictions on . . . protected speech, provided the restrictions 
‘are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’”106 On the other hand, a restric-
tion on expression is classified as content-based when the “govern-
ment [attempts] to regulate speech in ways that favor some view-
points or ideas at the expense of others.”107 A content-based restric-
tion can only withstand constitutional attack if it satisfies strict scru-
                                                                                                                      
 101. See Healy, supra note 83, at 51: 
Because a court must still follow past decisions even when it issues a non-
precedential opinion, problems arise only when the non-precedential opinion 
differs in a meaningful way from the precedents upon which it is based (or 
when it is based on no precedents at all, as in cases of first impression). There-
fore, as long as courts adopt a narrow rule for determining when non-
precedential opinions will be issued, along with mechanisms to ensure compli-
ance with that rule, the underlying values of stare decisis will be preserved. 
 102. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 126 (2002). 
 103. See Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules, 
3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 299 (2001). 
 104. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1162-63. 
 105. See 2002 Statements to Congress, supra note 17 (statement of Kenneth J. 
Schmier). 
 106. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
 107. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). 
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tiny, meaning that the restriction “must be narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling Government interest” and no “less restrictive al-
ternative would serve the . . . purpose.”108  
 Proponents of the First Amendment argument contend that re-
gardless of whether no-citation rules are classified as “content-
neutral” or “content-based,” they are unconstitutional restrictions on 
expression.109 The argument proposes that where no-citation rules 
are classified as content-neutral, the government’s interest in limit-
ing citation is slight, since exposure to such cases would not “signifi-
cantly interfere with the work of the judiciary.”110 Furthermore, al-
lowing citation merely for persuasive value is a much less restrictive 
alternative to barring citation altogether.111 Considering the height-
ened constitutional standard for a content-based restriction, no-
citation rules would similarly fail were they classified as content-
based. 
 On the other hand, Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, a long 
time advocate of no-citation rules, finds a strong judicial interest112 in 
excluding unpublished opinions from the attention of the court.113 
Judge Kozinski states, “[t]he prohibition against citation of unpub-
lished dispositions addresses a specific kind of fraud on the deciding 
court—the illusion that the unpublished disposition has sufficient 
facts and law to give the deciding court useful guidance.”114 Further-
more, in Hart, Judge Kozinski addressed several other interests of 
the judiciary in disallowing citation to unpublished opinions.115 
2. The First Amendment in Relation to Paradigmatic Publication 
Guidelines 
 Regardless of the merits, the First Amendment argument, like the 
Article III argument, is merely an after-thought when viewed in the 
context of paradigmatic publication guidelines. If a nontrivial argu-
ment prevailed for the first time, paradigmatic publication guidelines 
dictate the opinion be published and, as such, fully precedential. 
Thus, the litigant looking to cite an unpublished case for a significant 
                                                                                                                      
 108. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000). 
 109. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1162-63. 
 110. Id. at 1163. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Though Judge Kozinski’s statements were not made in response to an attack of 
no-citation rules on First Amendment grounds, they lend themselves to an application in 
such a context. 
 113. 2002 Statements to Congress, supra note 17 (statement of Judge Alex Kozinski). 
 114. Id. at 15. 
 115. See Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176-80 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting judicial in-
terests such as the strain on already taxed judicial resources where time devoted to writing 
unpublished opinions must increase for fear of misinterpretation, confusion, and unneces-
sary conflict). 
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proposition would be robbed of nothing since there would be a fully 
precedential case embodying the same proposition that can be cited. 
Once again, a litigant attempting to raise a First Amendment free 
speech claim would lack standing since the requirement of injury-in-
fact is not met—there is no cognizable injury from the rule com-
plained of.116 In other words, where paradigmatic publication guide-
lines are properly applied, the original premise—that a litigant is 
deprived of an argument in an unpublished opinion—is faulty since 
the very same argument would, if material, also be in a published 
opinion. 
 Furthermore, if an argument did not prevail, whether or not for 
the first time, and appears in an unpublished opinion, a litigant 
would be ill-advised to rely on such an unpublished case.117 In other 
words, the proposition was not only unpersuasive at the time, but not 
even valuable enough to trigger publication. If publication guidelines 
are followed precisely, the fact that an argument did not originally 
warrant publication would basically be determinative of its later suc-
cess. Be that as it may, a court would likely not find the litigant as 
having an injury, let alone standing on First Amendment grounds, 
where the litigant was deprived of the opportunity to cite to a dispo-
sition which would, at best, not help prove his or her case.118 
V.   POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PRECEDENTIAL VALUE IN 
LIGHT OF THE PUBLICATION PARADIGM 
 Even with the proliferation of unpublished opinions in recent dec-
ades, there have been rather few cases addressing constitutional 
challenges to local circuit no-citation rules. In fact, in a 1976 case, 
the Supreme Court rejected without comment the petitioner’s First 
Amendment claim against the circuit’s no-citation rule.119 Of the 
cases addressed by the court, only Anastasoff, which was later va-
cated on other grounds, found such rules unconstitutional.120 As such, 
much of the debate centers around the practical implications of pub-
lication guidelines and no-citation rules. In the sections that follow, 
these practical implications are set forth and viewed with regard to 
paradigmatic publication guidelines. 
                                                                                                                      
 116. For a brief overview of the standing requirement, see Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). 
 117. Published or otherwise, a litigant is always free to replicate the argument. 
 118. The more likely scenario is that a litigant would be hurt by being able to cite such 
a case since a previous court considered the argument and rejected it. 
 119. Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
429 U.S. 917 (1976) (declining writ of mandamus against the Seventh Circuit for having 
struck a citation to an unpublished opinion in petitioner’s brief). 
 120. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
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A.   Unequal Access to Unpublished Case Law in Light of Current 
Technology 
 One of the central rationales behind the implementation of selec-
tive publication plans in the 1960s and 1970s was the concern over 
the feasibility of establishing and maintaining legal libraries equally 
accessible to all in consideration of the enormous increase in the vol-
ume of cases being decided.121 With the advent of circuit websites, 
Westlaw, Lexis, and the Federal Appendix, accessibility to unpub-
lished opinions is, to a large extent, no longer a viable concern.122 
However, in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which do not make un-
published opinions available on their websites while allowing citation 
in briefs,123 there is some worry that institutional litigants who keep 
their own files might have an advantage over others without such 
ready access.124 Whatever this argument was worth, the E-
Government Act of 2002 has laid to rest any concerns over easy ac-
cess to unpublished dispositions.125 The effect of the Act is to force all 
federal appellate courts to post all opinions, including unpublished 
opinions, on their websites.126  Be that as it may, under the paradig-
matic publication model, an unpublished opinion still has no signifi-
cant precedential value and is of no use to future litigants. Even as-
suming some litigants have greater access to the unpublished body of 
law, no inequity would ensue since any proposition of consequence in 
an unpublished opinion must be substantially duplicated in a pub-
lished opinion.127 
B.   Lack of Judicial Resources as a Justification for Publication 
Guidelines 
 The federal judiciary has expanded in the past several decades, 
but not nearly at the rate of increased caseloads.128 As such, the con-
cern over the expanding caseload in the federal appellate judiciary is 
still, if not more so than previously, a poignant concern where judi-
                                                                                                                      
 121. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1141-42 (citing 1964 JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 14). 
 122. See Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished 
Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL. L. REV. 541, 556 (1997). 
 123. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4; 11TH CIR. R. 36-2. 
 124. See generally Barnett, supra note 92, at 6 n.28. 
 125. Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1151; see also Katsh & Chachkes, 
supra note 103, at 310 n.75 (noting that ‘“if summary orders indeed added nothing to the 
law, then it would not matter if they were not uniformly available to all parties’” (quoting 
2D CIR. R. § 0.23)).  
 128. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1151; 2002 Statements to Congress, 
supra note 17 (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.). 
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cial resources have not similarly developed to accommodate the grow-
ing caseload.129  
 As a staring point, Judge Kozinski points out in Hart that when 
crafting a published opinion, “the court must be careful to recite all 
facts that are relevant to its ruling, while omitting facts that it con-
siders irrelevant.”130 Because an opinion is unpublished “does not 
mean it is not fully considered, or that the disposition does not reflect 
a reasoned analysis of the issues presented.”131 It does mean, how-
ever, that dispositions can be disposed in a much more timely fashion 
if unpublished, since there is no need to draft an opinion with due 
regard for “the countless permutations of facts that might arise in 
the universe of . . . cases.”132 Limited publication plans allow judges 
to decide cases without precedential value using as little resources as 
possible, conserving those resources for cases that mandate a pub-
lished, and thus more time consuming, opinion. In conclusion, utiliz-
ing unpublished opinions are a necessary judicial tool as “few, if any, 
appellate courts have the resources to write precedential opinions in 
every case that comes before them.”133 
 The argument is all but incontestable in light of the current state 
of affairs in the federal appellate judiciary. However, the judicial re-
sources argument misses the root of the selective publication pre-
dicament. No one is arguing against the fact that published opinions 
take a great deal more time to produce than unpublished opinions. 
Once again, this issue only comes to fruition once the publication de-
cision has already been made. The judicial resources argument is 
only persuasive in the context of making the publication decision un-
der two equally unsatisfactory presumptions. First, a lack of judicial 
resources would impact the publication determination if publication 
guidelines are interpreted to reflect the idea that judges have the 
discretion not to publish opinions that should rightfully be pub-
lished.134 Such a state of affairs clearly does not comport with the 
American jurisprudential notion that we are a nation governed by 
laws, not by men.135 In other words, such arbitrary discretion in the 
hands of anyone in a position of power is plainly unacceptable. The 
other equally disturbing context in which a lack of judicial resources 
might affect the publication determination is where the judiciary has 
accepted a watered-down version of precedential value. In other 
                                                                                                                      
 129. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1145-46. 
 130. 266 F.3d 1155, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 131. Id. at 1177. 
 132. Id. at 1176. 
 133. Id. at 1177. 
 134. In fact, Judge Kozinski attempts to allay fears that publication decisions are not 
made in good faith. Id. at 1177 n.35. 
 135. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing this notion as embodied in the Fifth Amendment). 
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words, strained resources would force paradigmatic publication 
guidelines to be redefined such that, in the spectrum of precedential 
value a decision might contribute, only those somewhat near the high 
end warrant publication.136 Be that as it may, a review of the current 
local circuit publication guidelines discussed in Part II demonstrates 
an explicit aversion to that kind of compromise. Furthermore, the 
constitutional arguments so neatly disposed of under paradigmatic 
publication guidelines would become stronger than ever by increas-
ing the publication threshold—especially if such a position was pub-
licly held by the federal judiciary. Assuming actual publication rates 
must increase to meet this goal, there is no doubt that an amenable 
procedure to alleviate already strained judicial resources must be 
implemented. Nevertheless, strained resources seem to be an unac-
ceptable justification for compromising not only the efficient and 
complete development of case law, but quite possibly constitutional 
guarantees.137 
 Therefore, at best, the argument that a lack of judicial resources 
demand no-citation rules is directed at why publication guidelines 
should exist, while ignoring that publication guidelines operate to ex-
clude only decisions without precedential value. As such, the state of 
judicial resources is detached from any analysis under paradigmatic 
publication guidelines.138 
C.   Important Precedential Opinions Being Obscured by Those 
Without Precedential Value 
 As stated by Judge Alito in his 2002 statement to Congress, the 
judiciary is “concerned that important precedential opinions will be 
obscured by the thousands of opinions that are issued each year by 
the courts of appeals to decide cases that do not present any question 
of significant precedential value.”139 This argument is faulty on its 
                                                                                                                      
 136. Exactly how close to landmark a case must be to warrant publication is not rele-
vant. The point is that paradigmatic publication guidelines would have to be redefined to 
achieve a stricter publication threshold. 
 137. In recognizing the practical impact the court’s decision would have on the federal 
judiciary, Judge Arnold in Anastasoff proposed that the remedy is not:  
to create an underground body of law good for one place and time only. The 
remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that 
is not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a competent job with 
each case. If this means the backlogs will grow, the price must still be paid. 
223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
 138. Although paradigmatic publication guidelines eschew judicial resources in theo-
retical application, practical implications as a driving force behind the operation of the fed-
eral appellate judiciary are unquestionably imperative in reaching ultimate resolution. 
Paradigmatic publication guidelines work as a starting point to isolate exactly what should 
be the goal in developing our system of precedent. Any solution must necessarily build off 
these principles.  
 139. 2002 Statements to Congress, supra note 17 (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito, 
Jr.). 
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face. Judge Richard Posner, who on the whole favors publication 
plans, states that “[d]espite the vast number of published opinions, 
most federal circuit judges will confess that a surprising fraction of 
federal appeals, at least in civil cases, are difficult to decide not be-
cause there are too many precedents but because there are too few on 
point.”140 Even with numerous opinions, electronic databases im-
mensely ease the burden of sifting through large amounts of informa-
tion.141 Even so, under paradigmatic publication guidelines, the ar-
gument would be erroneous by definition. In order to be published, 
under paradigmatic publication guidelines, any opinion would have 
to be significant in some respect, regardless if one person or another 
subjectively finds the opinion important. In other words, any pub-
lished opinion would, in fact, have significant precedential value and 
not be subject to Judge Alito’s criticism. 
D.   The Fundamental Fairness Argument 
 The fairness argument, as exemplified in Anastasoff, basically 
states that allowing for the creation of non-precedential dispositions 
undermines the American jurisprudential idea that a “declaration of 
law is authoritative . . . and must be applied in subsequent cases to 
similarly situated parties.”142 Specifically, where a previous decision 
was decided in particular way, all later decisions must be decided in 
a like manner. A party is treated unfairly where his or her case is de-
cided differently than a previous, similarly situated party. Funda-
mental unfairness is implicated where a litigant has a previously de-
cided unpublished opinion involving a similarly situated party in his 
or her favor, yet the court does not rule favorably. In the context of a 
no-citation rule, the court will not even consider the previous unpub-
lished opinion, making the rule itself the direct cause of the funda-
mental unfairness in an unfavorable ruling. No-citation rules argua-
bly cause the court to fail in its duty to consistently decide cases in-
volving similarly situated litigants, thus violating the doctrine of 
precedent.143 
 The argument is persuasive, but again, is only a product of a mis-
application of publication guidelines. Theoretically, if the only case 
on point is unpublished,144 and that case is the only evidence that 
                                                                                                                      
 140. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 166 (1996). 
 141. See Shuldberg, supra note 122, at 556. 
 142. 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 
501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)), vacated 
as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 143. See also supra Part IV.A.2. 
 144. To be able to say an unpublished decision (which, by definition, does not necessar-
ily have a full recount of the facts and judicial reasoning) is on point with any particular 
situation is a shaky proposition in and of itself. See infra Part VII. 
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would otherwise persuade the court to find in the litigant’s favor, the 
problem arose at the time the panel made the decision not to publish 
the original case—for if paradigmatic publication guidelines were 
employed, the case would have been published,145 and the judgment 
in both cases must be in sync.146 Again, with no cognizable injury, the 
argument would never be presentable before the bench. 
VI.   UNATTAINABLE PARADIGMATIC PUBLICATION GUIDELINES 
A.   Local Circuit Publication Guidelines Are Not Applied in the 
Spirit of Paradigmatic Publication Guidelines 
 Donald Songer’s insightful, if not painfully apparent, observation 
sets the tone for this section:  
If the case involves, as the criteria suggest, the straightforward 
application of clear and well settled precedent which is not in need 
of any published explanation by the courts of appeals, then the 
correct decision and the correct basis of decision should be obvious 
to any person who is well trained in the law.147 
 Songer’s observation frequently comes to mind when appellate 
courts affirm district court decisions. Six of the thirteen circuits have 
rules specifically addressing summary affirmances or abbreviated 
dispositions apart from publication guidelines.148 These rules give cri-
teria (such as “the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is suffi-
cient”149) indicating where a published opinion need not be issued. 
However, all six rules, in addition to the stated criteria within the 
rule itself, have, as a separate requirement, the caveat that publish-
ing such a disposition would serve no precedential purpose.150 Logic 
dictates that because the summary affirmance rule speaks of prece-
dential value, the court would look toward the publication criteria for 
guidance. As long as courts are using the criteria from the summary 
affirmance rules in conjunction with those stated in their respective 
publication guidelines, the excess criteria ought to be redundant—
simply stating the standard of review the court must employ regard-
                                                                                                                      
 145. The mere fact that no other precedent can be cited in support of the position taken 
by the court indicates the need for publication. 
 146. Unless of course the previous case is overruled following the en banc process. Fur-
thermore, the problem of disparate treatment of like legal arguments (as distinct from the 
precedential value accorded them) within the same circuit at different times is a topic well 
outside the scope of this Comment. 
 147. Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 310 (1990). 
 148. See 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 6.2; 5TH CIR. R. 47.6; 8TH CIR. R. 47B; 11TH CIR. R. 36-1; 
D.C. CIR. R. 36(b); FED. CIR. R. 36. 
 149. FED. CIR. R. 36. 
 150. 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 6.2; 5TH CIR. R. 47.6; 8TH CIR. R. 47B; 11TH CIR. R. 36-1; 
D.C. CIR. R. 36(b); FED. CIR. R. 36. 
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less of those explicitly set forth.151 The fact that there are two rules 
arguably indicates a lack of rigor employed by the circuits in review-
ing the publication guidelines. 
 Oddly enough, many circuits allow for the issuance of dissents and 
concurrences within unpublished opinions.152 In fact, the Third Cir-
cuit explicitly contemplates such occurrences in stating: “A not pre-
cedential opinion may be issued without regard to whether the 
panel’s decision is unanimous and without regard to whether the 
panel affirms, reverses, or grants other relief.”153 This is a clear ex-
ample of how such circuits are not sincerely striving to achieve para-
digmatic publication guideline application. At the very least, this in-
dicates that in the Third Circuit, no single judge’s opinion as to the 
precedential value of an opinion controls.154 Can a decision be so clear 
as to warrant non-publication where three federal appellate court 
judges cannot agree on the outcome?155 If the answer is yes, then 
                                                                                                                      
 151. None of the six summary affirmance rules explicitly cross reference to publication 
guidelines. See supra note 150. 
 152. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 123 
S. Ct. 2607 (2003). Only the Second Circuit mandates unanimity in the outcome of the case 
in order not to publish. See 2D CIR. R. § 0.23 (“[I]n those cases in which decision is unani-
mous . . . [and] no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written opinion, disposi-
tion will be made [in unpublished form] . . . .”). Note, however, the language does not nec-
essarily imply that where the outcome is not unanimous an opinion must be in published 
form. Regardless, independent research demonstrates this to be the case. 
 153. 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.3; see also 1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(2)(C) (“When a panel decides 
a case with a dissent, or with more than one opinion, the opinion or opinions shall be pub-
lished unless all the participating judges decide against publication.”) (emphasis added). 
According to the Fifth Circuit “[a]n opinion may also be published if it: Is accompanied by a 
concurring or dissenting opinion.” 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (emphasis added). If any of the other 
enumerated publication criteria are met, publication is not discretionary—it is mandated. 
Id. 
 154. “A majority of the panel determines whether an opinion is designated as prece-
dential or not precedential . . . .” 3D CIR. R. App. I, IOP 5.1; see also 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (“An 
opinion shall be unpublished unless a majority of the panel decides to publish it.”). Unlike 
the Third Circuit, several other circuits allow for any single panel member to demand pub-
lication. For circuits that explicitly allow a single panel member to force publication, see 
1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(2)(B) (“[S]hould any judge [be] of the view that the opinion should be pub-
lished, it must be.”); 2D CIR. R. § 0.23 (Nonpublication where “each judge of the panel be-
lieves [publication is not warranted]”); 4TH CIR. R. 36(a) (“A judge may file a published 
opinion without obtaining all acknowledgements . . . .”); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.2 (“An opinion 
shall be published unless each member of the panel deciding the case determines that its 
publication is neither required nor justified under the criteria for publication.”); 6TH CIR. 
R. 206(b) (“An opinion or order shall be designated for publication upon the request of any 
member of the panel.”); 7TH CIR. R. 53(d)(2) (“[A] single federal judge [has the right] to 
make an opinion available for publication.”); 8TH CIR. R. App. I (3) (“[A] judge may make 
any of his opinions available for publication.”); FED. CIR. R. App. V, IOP 10(5) (“The elec-
tion to employ a nonprecedential opinion or a Rule 36 judgment shall be unanimous among 
the judges of the panel.”). Interestingly, in context, 7TH CIR. R. 53(d)(2) states: “Notwith-
standing the right of a single federal judge to make an opinion available for publication, it 
is expected that a single judge will ordinarily respect and abide by the opinion of the ma-
jority in determining whether to publish.” This begs the question of whether the other cir-
cuits allowing a single judge to publish are similarly salutary in nature. 
 155. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1149 (2002): 
2004]                          PUBLICATION PLANS 777 
 
courts are all but admitting that what should be has given way to 
what must be. In other words, the strain on judicial resources de-
mands such an outcome, making publication guidelines merely a 
salutary gesture.  
 While independent review of the facts of a case can indicate publi-
cation errors, empirical data, though not conclusive, is a more reli-
able source to determine whether publication guidelines have been 
improperly applied.156 For example, a 1985 study found that in 1984, 
twenty-four percent of all unpublished opinions in the federal courts 
of appeals were reversals.157 A reversal indicates a disagreement in a 
legal outcome and arguably demonstrates the heightened signifi-
cance of the issue presented—potentially heightened to a point war-
ranting publication.158 Instances of unpublished opinions being re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court also intimate that publi-
cation criteria are improperly applied.159  
 The most visible example of a publication error is displayed by 
Anastasoff itself. The court found itself constitutionally bound to fol-
low an unpublished opinion which apparently decided an issue of 
first impression under federal tax law.160 Regardless of the propriety 
of the court’s decision, the original panel clearly made a publication 
                                                                                                                      
If a case is clearly governed by well-established precedent and presents no spe-
cial facts, what possible need could there be for separate concurrences? If there 
is, that is itself a strong indication that the case, no matter how trivial it may 
have seemed on first blush, did not belong on the nonpublication track in the 
first place. 
 156. See Nat’l Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 173 (1985) (Wald, 
J., concurring) (citing REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURES TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 45 (May 1984), and noting the Committee’s finding that of 
“the unpublished decisions issued by the court in 1983, . . . 40 percent of the decisions ar-
guably should have been published under the court’s governing criteria”); Greenwald & 
Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1153-55; Katsh & Chachkes, supra note 103, at 307-12 nn.64-75 
(citing many cases the authors believe to be of first impression decided in unpublished 
form). 
 157. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1154 (citing a study performed by Donna 
Stienstra in Unpublished Dispositions: Problems of Access and Use in the Courts of Appeals 
42 (Federal Judicial Center 1985)). In addition, Kenneth Schmier, in his statement to Con-
gress, described several instances where, in his opinion, cases warranting publication were 
resolved as unpublished. See 2002 Statements to Congress, supra note 17 (statement of 
Kenneth J. Schmier). Mr. Schmier also maintains a website dedicated to the issue of publi-
cation and no-citation rules which contains examples of what he believes to be misapplica-
tions of stated publication guidelines. The Committee for the Rule of Law, at http:// 
www.nonpublication.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2003). 
 158. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1154. 
 159. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 
(2002) (reversing an unpublished decision from the Federal Circuit); Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (reversing an unpublished decision from the Second Cir-
cuit).  
 160. See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (purporting to be bound by Christie v. United 
States, No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992)). 
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error in issuing an unpublished, nonprecedential opinion in response 
to an issue of first impression.161 Another poignant example of a court 
straying from its publication guidelines occurred in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, where the court affirmed the unconstitutionality of a federal 
statute in an unpublished, per curium opinion.162  
B.   Why Publication Guidelines Cannot Be Followed Precisely 
 Following publication guidelines precisely is important due to the 
impact of a decision being rendered unpublished. That is to say that 
an unpublished opinion, whether citable or not, has been deemed 
worthless as any kind of guide to future courts and litigants.163 
 Though some commentators suggest that judges may have dubi-
ous motives and purposely bury unwanted decisions in unpublished 
form,164 the more palatable, if not more likely, reason behind errors 
in the application of publication guidelines is simple human limita-
tion. For example, the subtleties and complexities of an issue might 
not be revealed in a case inadequately briefed by the litigants or 
where the actual decision of the case appears fairly obvious. With the 
volume of cases appellate judges hear, there is no doubt that such 
situations arise. Instances where the United States Supreme Court 
has reversed unpublished opinions also tend to implicate either a 
misapplication of publication guidelines or, at the very least, an error 
in judgment as to the importance of the issue presented.165 More im-
portantly, these examples demonstrate the difficulty in distinguish-
ing decisions worthy of publication from those devoid of precedential 
value.166 
 Considering that case assignment is random, evidence that judges 
within the same circuit have differing publication rates also displays 
                                                                                                                      
 161. See 8TH CIR. R. App. I(4)(a) (“An opinion should be published when the case or 
opinion establishes a new rule of law . . . in this Circuit.”). 
 162. Edge Broad. Co. v. United States, 956 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curium) (un-
published table decision). The case was subsequently reversed in United States v. Edge 
Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), where the majority noted in footnote three: “We 
deem it remarkable and unusual that although the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment 
that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the court found it appropriate to 
announce its judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion.” 
 163. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1152-53 (“[T]he consequence of not 
publishing a useful precedent is much greater than the consequence of publishing a redun-
dant, useless one.”). 
 164. See generally Carpenter, Jr., supra note 32; Dragich, supra note 32. 
 165. See, e.g., Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature 
of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 20-21, & n.17 (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 
694 (2000); Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 
U.S. 375 (1994); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. 
Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Moore v. Illinois, 434 
U.S. 220 (1977)). 
 166. See supra note 165. 
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an inconsistent application of publication guidelines.167 This inconsis-
tency between such highly respected legal scholars speaks volumes 
as to the implausibility of paradigmatic publication guideline appli-
cation within the current publication system. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 The fact that paradigmatic publication guideline application can 
never be attained does not necessarily bring the original constitu-
tional and policy arguments back to life in a practical sense. Because 
unpublished opinions are only written for the parties and contain 
neither a detailed factual account nor the full reasoning behind the 
deciding panel’s decision,168 a proper case to actually test these theo-
ries will not likely be found.169 The fact that a current decision ap-
pears to match, on its face, a particular unpublished opinion does not 
make it a prime candidate as a test case. Because unpublished opin-
ions do not contain the full facts and reasoning of the court and pub-
lication guidelines, even as exhaustively delineated as possible, are 
still vague, a panel will rarely be faulted for deciding not to publish a 
disposition, especially in a close decision. Even if the unpublished 
opinion seems to fit squarely into a category mandating publication, 
the panel can simply cite Judge Kozinski in Hart for the proposition 
that, because the decision was unpublished and not crafted with pre-
cision, it only appears to fit into the publication guidelines.170 This 
point plainly cannot be refuted as there is no other record of the case 
(short of a retrial or attempting to depose the deciding panel) 
through which to dispute the claim. 
                                                                                                                      
 167. See Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Pre-
dicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 112-13 
(2001) (“Judges from different circuits apply relatively similar publication criteria to arrive 
at widely different publication rates. This lack of uniformity suggests that judges do not 
make consistent publication decisions.”); Songer, supra note 147, at 310; Patricia M. Wald, 
The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1371, 1376 (1995) (In the “D.C. Circuit, the wide gap between the number of published and 
unpublished opinions written by different judges gives pause.”). 
 168. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(b) (“Unpublished opinions give counsel, the parties, and 
the lower court or agency a statement of the reasons for the decision. They may not recite 
all of the facts or background of the case and may simply adopt the reasoning of the lower 
court.”); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An unpublished 
disposition is, more or less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts, an-
nouncing the result and the essential rationale of the court’s decision.”). 
 169. Evidence of a lack of test cases is clear when one compares the mountainous vol-
ume of commentary in this area against the scarcity of actual case law (i.e. only two cases: 
Anastasoff, which is vacated and no longer good law, and Hart, which dismissed the Article 
III argument). See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as 
moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Hart, 266 F.3d at 1155. 
 170. See 266 F.3d at 1176-78. Of course, this argument only speaks to the subjective 
factors making up the publication, not objective factors such as where the decision “re-
verses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency has 
published an opinion supporting the judgment or order.” 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1)(v). 
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 As such, the proper forum for an attempt at rules reform is the 
Rules Advisory Committee (leading up to the eventual adoption of a 
uniform Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure binding all thirteen 
federal circuits). A nationally uniform rule may not be a necessity, 
but considering the wide array of individual circuit rules and the 
criticism each has received, the time for circuit experimentation is 
over. And a national uniform rule is exactly what has been approved 
in principle by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules.171 How-
ever, the proposed rule, which would allow for the citation of any un-
published opinion for persuasive value, only deals with citation of 
unpublished opinions.172 Though a step in the right direction, it fails 
to address the most critical aspect of the problem—circuits still have 
no uniform guidance in making the publication determination. Sim-
ply lifting the citation ban overlooks the source of the problem—the 
publication plan. The publication decision carries with it important 
consequences. In a strict sense, the publication decision determines 
whether the disposition will be binding circuit precedent subject to 
the en banc process to overrule or merely used for persuasive value.  
 An argument for allowing citation of unpublished opinions to the 
court is rather compelling. Since judges see a variety of sources in 
briefs, including restatements, treatises, law review articles, legal 
encyclopedias, and the like, the judiciary is well trained in ascertain-
ing the proper weight to assign a particular authority brought before 
it. As such, unpublished opinions should be similar to other authority 
in that judges may assign whatever persuasive value is appropri-
ate.173 
 The argument is sound, but it must be tempered with certain re-
alities. To begin with, by the explicit wording of several rules, unpub-
lished opinions do not likely contain a full factual account of the 
situation.174 Even if the disposition has a full factual account, a later 
panel would have no way to achieve independent verification short of 
where the disposition itself actually said such. Judge Kozinski fur-
ther addresses this problem in Hart, noting that because an unpub-
lished opinion “is, more or less, a letter from the court to parties fa-
                                                                                                                      
 171. See Alito Memorandum, supra note 29, at 28; see also supra Part II.D. 
 172. Supra note 171. 
 173. See Carpenter, Jr., supra note 32, at 240-42 (finding that not only should unpub-
lished opinions be citable for persuasive value but further that “[t]he only real question is 
whether unpublished opinions would obtain a rank equal to binding, published decisions or 
whether they should occupy a new and unique position beneath binding authority but 
above primary and secondary persuasive sources”). 
 174. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(b) (stating that “[an unpublished opinion] may not recite 
all of the facts or background of the case and may simply adopt the reasoning of the lower 
court”); see also FED. CIR. R. App. V, IOP 10(3) (stating that “[n]onprecedential dispositions 
should not unnecessarily state the facts nor tell the parties what they argued, or what they 
otherwise already know. It is sufficient to tell the losing party why its arguments were not 
persuasive.”). 
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miliar with the facts, announcing the result and the essential ration-
ale of the court’s decision”175 the disposition “is not written in a way 
that will be fully intelligible to those unfamiliar with the case, and 
the rule of law is not announced in a way that makes it suitable for 
governing future cases.”176  
 Thus, even reliance for persuasive value on what appears facially 
to be a fully accounted unpublished opinion for an uncertain material 
proposition is problematic at best.177 Especially considering that, if 
the unpublished opinion did contain all relevant facts and precise 
court reasoning, the aims of publication plans—namely, saving judi-
cial resources by not delineating all facts and court reasoning—would 
be lost, leaving no reason why the opinion was not published in the 
first instance. Not to mention the fact that if the unpublished opinion 
really did clear up a material uncertainty, it should have been pub-
lished at the outset. In fact, Judge Kozinski, in his statement to Con-
gress, considers “[t]he prohibition against citation of unpublished 
dispositions [as] address[ing] a specific kind of fraud on the deciding 
court—the illusion that the unpublished disposition has sufficient 
facts and law to give the deciding court useful guidance.”178  
 Furthermore, even if a court allows an unpublished opinion to be 
cited for its persuasive value, the deference the court will accord is 
minimal.179 Not only is the case devoid of the full factual account and 
reasoning, but the stamp of “not for publication” is itself indicative of 
the court’s assessment of the case; namely, according to the explicit 
wording of every circuit’s rule, the case has been deemed by the court 
as having no precedential value.180 
 Be that as it may, persuasive reasons still exist for citation to un-
published opinions, even if not as guidance in deciding a particular 
question of law. Without significantly disturbing the argument 
against citation, unpublished opinions may be cited to demonstrate 
the frequency with which an issue arises, signaling the need for the 
                                                                                                                      
 175. 266 F.3d at 1178. 
 176. Id. 
 177. The most important reason to resort to an unpublished opinion in any case is 
where a material uncertainty about a proposition is not addressed by a published opinion.  
 178. 2002 Statements to Congress, supra note 17 (statement of Judge Alex Kozinski). 
 179. The D.C. Circuit (which allows citation to unpublished opinions issued after 
January 1, 2002) has the most liberal rule regarding unpublished dispositions. See D.C. 
CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B). Rule 28(c)(1)(B) actually states that an unpublished opinion “may be 
cited as precedent.” Id. However, another rule explicitly states that the panel issuing such 
an opinion “sees no precedential value in that disposition.” D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2). Simple 
logic fails to comport with the idea that a panel, when deciding an issue, will be signifi-
cantly influenced by an opinion dubbed by a previous panel of peers (or the deciding panel 
itself) as having “no precedential value.” Id.  
 180. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, which allows citation of unpublished opinions, 
states: “Opinions that the panel believes to have no precedential value are not published.” 
11TH CIR. R. 36-3, IOP 5. 
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court to take an authoritative stance.181 Arguably, such a case might 
be published under paradigmatic publication guidelines,182 but the 
reality is that courts are not omniscient and may not realize the is-
sue is one of public importance. Furthermore, a string of unpublished 
cases can be used to give notice to the court that a relatively old pre-
cedential published case has been cited several times and is still good 
law.183  
 In addition, the ability to cite unpublished opinions might operate 
as a quasi-oversight function in the application of publication guide-
lines. The quasi-oversight feature works in two ways. First, where a 
decision was improperly disposed of in unpublished fashion, citation 
to the previous decision would help the court recognize and remedy 
the oversight where the issue presents itself again. Second, where 
unpublished decisions are regularly brought to the court’s attention, 
judicial accountability, awareness, and recognition of the preceden-
tial issues incident to the publication decision will increase. In other 
words, constantly being exposed to unpublished cases will sharpen 
judges’ perception of what decisions should or should not be disposed 
of as unpublished. 
 In any case, the argument against citation seems more aimed at 
persuading courts that, once citation restrictions are lifted, they 
should not be applied retroactively. In other words, courts must 
change their methodology when crafting unpublished decisions since 
they are no longer for the sole use of the court and parties involved. 
Both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits have taken this into account in lift-
ing their respective citation bans.184 Such rules demonstrate that 
panels must change their understanding of how unpublished opin-
ions should be written given those cases may be cited back to them. 
 In order to accomplish the stated goal of only publishing those 
opinions with precedential value, courts must adopt a uniform publi-
cation plan, incorporating procedures beyond a mere listing of crite-
ria designed to yield consistent publication decisions. Considering 
the discretionary nature of the publication determination, a feasible 
                                                                                                                      
 181. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1151-53. 
 182. Specifically, the guideline dealing with an issue of public interest would be impli-
cated. See supra Part III. 
 183. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 19, at 1152. But see, Philip Nichols, Jr., Se-
lective Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 916 (1986) (find-
ing the argument of using a string cite to prove the continued authority of a case unper-
suasive). 
 184. Both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits have explicit rules addressing citation of unpub-
lished opinions issued both before and after the citation ban was lifted. See 5TH CIR. R. 
47.5.3, 47.5.4 (stating “unpublished opinion[s] should normally be cited only when the doc-
trine of res judicata . . . [etc.] is applicable” for unpublished opinions issued before January 
1, 1996; allowing free citation to unpublished opinions issued after this date); D.C. CIR. R. 
28(c)(1)(A), 28(c)(1)(B) (not allowing citation to unpublished opinions issued before January 
1, 2002; citation to unpublished opinions issued after this date is permitted).  
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mechanism for uniformity must include some sort of oversight proce-
dure. The least intrusive measure begins with unanimity in the non-
publication decision.185 The next step is the institution of publication 
committees within each circuit. Committees should be composed of 
circuit judges, rotating in membership, whose function is to critically 
review a sample of decisions chosen for nonpublication. Such commit-
tees would help foster a cohesive and consistent understanding 
within the circuit of those opinions constituting significant preceden-
tial value and thus warranting publication. Such an oversight fea-
ture clearly depends on earnest judicial participation for success.  
 Other key elements to an efficient and uniform publication plan 
are education and communication. Judges must understand the phi-
losophy behind the text of the publication criteria and be willing to 
discuss and develop those ideals among peers. Each individual judge 
must understand and hold similar principles in relation to the selec-
tive publication plan. Considering the volume of cases the federal 
appellate judiciary confronts, implementation will certainly be diffi-
cult, but the resultant strengthening of the federal appellate judicial 
system more than justifies the cost. Although the language of the 
publication guidelines may not change dramatically, with enough 
communication, a uniform idea of the elusive concept of “precedential 
value” can be developed. While there will always be problems, if the 
judiciary can gain a uniform understanding of just what precedential 
value means, consistent publication decisions will emerge and the 
debate over unpublished opinions can finally be settled. 
 
                                                                                                                      
 185. See supra Part VI.A. 
